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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF 
RECOVERY SERVICES, ] 
Plaintiff- ] 
Respondent, 
v. 
BETTY A. WHITAKER, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No, 860673 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Throughout its responding brief, plaintiff maintains 
that the administrative proceeding which was underway prior to 
the filing of its complaint dealt solely with the issue of case 
closure. Thus, it declares: 
a. The fair hearing officer's responsibility was to 
make a decision whether the case closure was proper 
under APA law and policy. Brief of Respondent, at 
13; 
b. The important point for this appeal is that the 
administrative hearing officer is not reviewing 
whether a debt in a sum certain is due and owing, but 
merely whether closure of a public assistance case 
was proper." Brief of Respondent, at 15; and 
c. The fair hearing officer's decisions deal with 
eligibility standards and case closure." Brief of 
Respondent, at 19. 
Plaintiff's assertions leave unanswered several 
significant questions: 
1. If the administrative proceeding was con-
cerned solely with eligibility standards and proper 
case closure, why was the Office of Recovery Services 
(ORS), whose very name implies that it is in the 
business of recovering overpayments, so heavily 
involved in that administrative process? 
2. Why did Mr. Terry Schow, an ORS investiga-
tor, send three separate notices to defendant con-
cerning the overpayment during the latter months of 
1984? (Appendix "1-1-3" of Appellant's Brief) 
3. Why did Mr. Schow receive notice of defen-
dant's September 17, 1985 hearing? (Attached as 
Appendix "T") 
4. Why did the ORS representative (Terry Schow) 
appear at defendant's administrative hearing and 
concede certain facts? (Plaintiff's Exhibit "I", at 
xxviii) 
5. Why did Emma Chacon, ORS Bureau Director, 
submit a "significant response to the Claimant's 
Memorandum which could impact the outcome of this 
case."? (Attached as Appendix "U") 
6. Why did plaintiff's counsel, who represents 
ORS on overpayments but who does not represent the 
State of Utah on case closures, contact the Hearing 
Examiner by letter dated December 13, 1985 concerning 
defendant's pending administrative case? (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit "K", at xxxiii) 
7. Why did plaintiff's counsel by letter dated 
October 31, 1986 contact The Honorable Bill L. 
Walker, Administrative Law Judge, in response to 
defendant's appeal of the hearing decision? (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit "J", at xxxii) 
The answer to these questions is clear: ORS through 
its representatives and legal counsel was involved at every 
stage of the administrative proceeding for the sole purpose of 
The relevant portion of the decision states: "The Office 
of Recovery Services' representative considered this fact at 
the hearing." Considering the context, the word intended was 
probably "conceded." 
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establishing and thereafter recovering an overpayment. Its 
involvement had nothing to do with a determination of eligibil-
ity or proper closure of plaintiff!s case; instead, its efforts 
were directed toward a res judicata factual determination that 
an overpayment existed which could then be used as a basis for 
recovery through the judicial process or through the adminis-
trative procedures available under U.C.A. §55-15e-l e_t. seq. 
Plaintiff makes further assertions concerning the 
issue before the fair hearing officer which are not supported 
by the record. It states: 
a. The fair hearing officer's responsibility was to 
make a decision whether the case closure was proper 
under APA law and policy. (Brief of Respondent, at 
13; and 
b. The fair hearing officer is not responsible to 
adjudicate a specific overpayment debr. (Brief of 
Respondent, at 14) (emphasis in the original) 
However, when the fair hearing officer's decision is examined, 
the opposite is true. The Hearing Examiner speaks not of case 
closure but of whether an overpayment was correctly computed. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "I", at xxv. Pertinent portions of the 
fair hearing officer's decision state: 
a. NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED: That the decision 
by the District I Office of Community Operations in 
computing a Financial Food Stamp overpayment is 
hereby sustained. (Plaintiff's Exhibit I, at xxv); 
b. The claimant requested the hearing on December 
26, 1984 to appeal a decision .... closing the 
claimant's financial assistance case and subsequent 
determination of an overpayment. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
I, at xxvi); 
c. It is undisputed that the November and December, 
1984 notices contained no explanation of the decision 
for the overpayment determination. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "I", at xxix); 
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d. The Hearing Examiner, however, finds that the 
claimant's overpayment is properly before the Hearing 
Examiner, and he does have the right to review the 
case based upon the facts. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "I", 
at xxx) 
e. The significant factual issue before the Hearing 
Examiner is whether or not there is an overpayment 
existing based upon the equity in the house. (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit "I", at xxx-xxxi); and 
f. The decision by the District I Office of Commu-
nity Operations in computing a Financial Food Stamp 
overpayment is hereby sustained. The overpayment 
should be classified as a factual error. (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit "I", at xxxi) 
Nowhere in the Hearing Examiner's decision is there indication 
that the sole purpose of the administrative proceeding was to 
determine whether the case had been properly closed. The 
content of the administrative decision shows that the purpose 
of the hearing was to establish whether an overpayment existed. 
If it did, and if defendant took no further appeal of that 
decision, ORS could have recovered the overpayment in several 
ways: 
a. Had defendant again become eligible for financial 
assistance, the overpayment could have been recovered 
through an allotment reduction; 
b. ORS could have used the decision as a res 
judicata factual determination for summary judgment 
purposes in a judicial proceeding; 
c. Since ORS had filed a notice of overpayment 
determination under U.C.A. §55-15e, and since its 
representative (Schow) apparently stipulated to 
joinder of that action with the pending adminis-
trative proceeding, ORS could have arguably docketed 
a judgment pursuant to the authority found at U.C.A. 
§55-15e-8. 
The factual determination at the administrative level had a 
real importance to ORS in its recovery of an alleged overpay-
ment. Its participation at the administrative level evidences 
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that. Given this fact, plaintiff's argument that the adminis-
trative proceeding had no bearing on its filing of a complaint 
in district court is without merit. 
At page 16 of its brief, plaintiff argues that it hac 
clear statutory authority to bring an independent action at the 
same time the administrative case was pending. If the authori-
ty to file an independent action was so clear, one must ques-
tion why plaintiff's complaint does not reflect that clarity. 
Instead of simply stating that it was demanding recovery of an 
overpayment, plaintiff made an ambiguous reference in paragraph 
4 of its complaint to jurisdiction based on U.C.A. §55-15a-25 
which permits a trial de novo following the conclusion of an 
administrative proceeding. Plaintiff's ambiguous pleading is 
relevant, since it evidences the fact that it did not consider 
its complaint to be an independent action, but rather a hybrid 
cause of action, sprung from its own imagination, by which it 
might invoke the jurisdiction of the district court and thereby 
obtain a prejudgment writ of attachment. Plaintiff's rationale 
that it had authority for an independent cause of action came 
after the fact when its jurisdictional basis was challenged by 
a motion to dismiss. While plaintiff's handiwork may be 
imaginative, the resulting creation does violence to the 
statute and tramples recklessly over established case law. 
At several points in its brief, Plaintiff acknowledg-
es the undesirable possibility of concurrent actions at the 
administrative and judicial levels. Plaintiff blithely con-
cludes that "common sense" will eliminate concurrent litigation 
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of the same issue in both forums* Brief of Respondent, at 11, 
25 Plaintiff glosses over the fact that common sense did not 
preclude concurrent actions in this case. Plaintiff further 
ignores the fact that even as this case is pending before this 
Court, the administrative decision in defendant's case is 
pending on appeal before an administrative law judge. Theoret-
ically, the ALJ could rule in defendant's favor. Alternative-
ly, the same ALJ could uphold the administrative decision, 
which would then trigger defendant's right to further review at 
the judicial level. As defendant has argued in her opening 
brief, adoption of plaintiff's legal argument could result in 
actions proceeding in three separate forums. See Brief of 
Appellant, at 16. Theoretically, all three proceedings could 
end up at the district and appellate court levels. It is such 
judicial ineconomy that the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies was designed to prevent. 
CONCLUSION 
Administrative proceedings under U.C.A. §§55-15a and 
55-15e are important means for the recovery of overpayments by 
ORS. Plaintiff has underscored the importance of such proceed-
ings by its involvement in defendant's case throughout the 
administrative process. Plaintiff's involvement belies its 
facile assertion that the administrative process was solely for 
the purpose of determining whether defendant's case was proper-
ly closed. Under the relevant statutes and case law, an admin-
istrative procedure permitting alternative means for recovery 
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of an overpayment cannot be maintained concurrently with a 
judicial action* 
Approval of plaintiff's interpretation of the statute 
and case law will contribute to further confusion in the 
recovery of overpayments and further burden the Utah judicial 
system. Such an undesirable result can be easily avoided by 
application of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies to this case. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of fjtA fu* f 1987. 
MZTCHAEL E. BULSON " 
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Robert D. 
Barclay, Attorney for Plaintiff, at Office of Recovery Servic-
es, 2540 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401, via first-class 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 7~Q1 day of //• ^  cu 5 t , 
1987. J 
MICHAEL E. BULSON 
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant 
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Social Services Scott M Matheson Governor State of Utah Norman G Angus Executive Director 
September 5, 1985 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Claimant: Betty Ann Whitaker 
240 North 100 West 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Location: District II (A) 0C0-APA Office 
385 - 24th Street, Third Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Date and Time: September 17, 1985 
1:40 P.M. 
Issues to be Considered: Overpayment/Office of Recovery Services Notice, 
You are directed to appear and to bring such witnesses and evidence as you 
desire to present at that time. You may be represented by an attorney, and 
you may question witnesses and examine evidence presented at the hearing. 
If the time, date or location of the hearing is inconvenient, or if you wish 
to withdraw your request for a hearing, please notify our office promptly in 
order that the hearing may be rescheduled or canceled. 
Sincerely, 
Neal Bernson ^ 
Fair Hearing Officer 
NB/ss 
cc: Ctirtis L. Child 
Kyle Snow 
Julia Bosley 
Elaine Gunnarson 
Terry Schow 
Don Knight 
NOTE: CHANGE OF DATE, TIME AND LOCATION OF HEARING. 
Office of Administrative Hearings 
J Steven Eklund Director 
150 West North Temple Suite 353 
PO Box 2500 Salt Lake City Utah 84110-2500 
801 -533-7386 & 533-6586 
An Equal Opportunity Employer 
APPENDIX T 
Social Services 
T0: Neal Bernson 
Administrative Hearing Officer 
From: Emma Chacory^Bureau Director 
Office of Recovery Services 
Subject: Betty Ann Whi taker 
Memorandum 
Date: October 21, 1985 
Due to my anticipated maternity leave in the near future and the extent of the 
Claimant's Memorandum filed in behalf of Betty Ann Whitaker by Mr. Curt 
Chi Ids, I would like to request a continuance of the hearing and response time 
for a period of 60 days. The Office of Recovery Services will have a 
significant response to the Claimant's Memorandum which could impact the 
outcome of this case. 
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated, 
comments, please contact me. 
If you have any questions or 
ELC/gt 
cc: Brenda 
Elaine 
Hofer 
Gunnarson 
'% 
DSS-30 12/77 An Equal Opportunity Employer 
APPENDIX U 
